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Abstract
Many theoretical central bank models use short horizons and focus on a single tradeoff. How-
ever, in reality, central banks play complex, long-horizon games and face more than one tradeoff.
We account for these strategic interactions in a simple infinite-horizon game with a novel trade-
off: tighter monetary policy deters financial imbalances, but looser monetary policy reduces the
likelihood of insolvency. We term these factors discipline and stability effects, respectively. The
central bank’s welfare decreases with dependence between real and financial shocks, so it may
reduce costs with correlation-indexed securities. An independent central bank cannot in general
attain both low inflation and financial stability.
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1. Introduction
The aftermath of the 2008 crisis featured a large effort by central banks and monetary author-
ities to address the question of financial fragility. In particular, central banks attempted to utilize
novel methods to shore up the financial system and stave off potential incipient crises. A natural
challenge concerns the extent to which central banks can actually achieve the goal of monitoring
financial stability, while conducting more traditional roles of managing price and output stability.
Our paper attempts to address this issue.
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Practically, a number of central banks have grappled with this challenge. For example, after
the crisis, the Norwegian Central Bank explicitly included an additional “financial stability” term
in the loss function of their analytical framework, using the deviation of the monetary policy rate
from the long term equilibrium rate as a proxy for financial fragility. This consideration is exactly
captured in our model, indicating that the central bank should internalize the social cost of finan-
cial instability in their decision making. Worldwide, regulators have been raising required capital
ratios for banks, and imposing capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions.
These approaches can be seen in our model as reducing the number of undercapitalized banks,
thereby ameliorating the social cost from bank failures.
What does a central bank do if it finds itself in a situation that is ex ante suboptimal for the
banking system? There is a growing literature on optimal central bank policy towards banking
intermediaries. Much of the game theoretic literature uses three or four period examples of
the tension between central bank and intermediary incentives, which often allows for attractive
optimality results.1 The relevant challenge which we tackle is that many game-theoretic models
of monetary policy and stability consider short horizons, and only analyze a single tradeoff.
This setting is problematic because real world central banks face multiple tradeoffs with long
horizons. Such multiple tradeoffs are particularly onerous because many central banks have one
main policy tool during normal times, the interbank interest rate. The question we address is
“What are the limits of monetary policy for a one-tool central bank which faces multiple policy
tradeoffs that manifest over long horizons?”
While our paper adds to existing central bank literature that is based on games, it is comple-
mentary to another strand of research, namely dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models. This latter, non-game based literature, has recently started to tackle the issue of multiple
tradeoffs between price and financial stability.2 Another related literature uses dynamic general
equilibrium models to address the issue of credit market imperfections and systemic externali-
ties that derive from bank-level financial fragility.3 This research has recently begun to uncover
important limitations and extensions of previous work on optimal monetary policy.
An important strength of the DSGE approach is that it permits formalization of infinite hori-
zon problems in a straightforward manner. Until recently, the DSGE approach was not utilized
in studying strategic interaction and sustainable cooperation between intermediaries and central
banks. While DSGE is an excellent tool for analysing dynamic equilibrium, for questions of
purely strategic issues, a game theory approach has been shown to be complementary in the liter-
ature on central bank policy, as shown in the line of literature beginning with Barro and Gordon
(1983). Because of the above reasons, we pursue this complementary approach, and highlight the
importance of strategic interaction with a game-based analysis. Our game-theoretic framework
may provide an alternative, complementary perspective to the abovementioned, ongoing DSGE
research.
We complement the existing literature in several dimensions. First, as mentioned above, re-
cently there have been papers analyzing the strategic interaction between the banking sector and
the central bank in a DSGE framework, such as Cuciniello and Signoretti (2015), who analyzes
1See Freixas et al. (2000); Chapter 7 of Allen and Gale (2007); and Allen et al. (2009).
2See Faia and Monacelli (2007); Carlstrom et al. (2010); Otrok et al. (2012); Angelini et al. (2012); Angeloni and
Faia (2013); De Fiore and Tristani (2013); and Unsal (2013).
3See Jeanne and Korinek (2010); Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011); Korinek (2011); Agénor et al. (2012); and Jeanne
and Korinek (2013). For an overlapping generations approach, see Galí (2014). After the working paper version of our
paper was distributed, we have become of other recent research in this area, including Collard et al. (2012); Kannan et
al. (2012); Ueda (2013); Rabanal and Quint (2014); and Ueda and Valencia (2014).
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the interaction of intermediaries and central banks, using a DSGE setup.4 The latter authors de-
rive an amplification mechanism that is positively correlated with the level of the central bank’s
inflation targeting. In their paper, the large banks’ pricing on loans affects macroeconomic out-
comes, which generates a feedback on monetary policy. Therefore this line of research mainly
deals with the banks’ role in amplifying real volatilities, instead of the fragility of the economy.
Our paper is complementary to Cuciniello and Signoretti (2015), since we focus on the fragility
issue rather than inflation alone. Specifically, in our paper we address the impact of banks’
strategic behavior on financial stability, which allows us to analyze the central bank’s tradeoff
between price stability and financial fragility. In Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), financial fragility
arises from the fact that depositors can run on the banks when a sufficiently large negative shock
on fundamentals is anticipated. However, the modeling framework is complex enough that it
abstracts from business cycles. Thus, although it is a proper framework for designing policy for
banking crises, it tends to say less about the central bank’s tradeoff between price stability and
financial fragility in normal times.
Banks have the potential to affect financial stability through their risk-taking behavior, while
banks’ incentive in risk-taking is partially driven by monetary policy. Consequently, such risk-
taking is a crucial link for the feedback between monetary policy and financial stability. Angeloni
et al. (2015) is one of the seminal papers on this linkage. In this approach, banks’ risk-taking
behavior is completely undesirable socially, which is not always the case in reality. Indeed,
banking is inherently about risk-taking: through maturity transformation, banks take liquidity
risk and improve risk sharing in the economy. The truly undesired result is not banks’ risk-
taking per se, but rather, excessive risk-taking. One contribution in this paper is to explain
how banks’ excess risk-taking endogenously arise from fire sale externalities, i.e., the individual
bank does not internalize the impact of its failure on social fire sale cost. Banks’ risk-taking
in equilibrium enters the central bank’s decision problem through the classic Barro and Gordon
(1983) model, while the dynamic game theoretic approach makes it tractable to analyze the
central bank’s tradeoffs in an analytical solution.
Our paper obviously builds on the important work of Kashyap and Stein (2012). We add
value to the Kashyap-Stein framework in three dimensions. First, we deepen their insight by
formalizing the tradeoff between fragility and inflation, allowing for potential correlation of real
and financial shocks. This setup delivers a feedback effect to central banks. Second, we endo-
genize the aforementioned feedback effect, based on a strategic model of interaction between
the real economy and the banking sector. Third, we develop a simple long run framework and
characterize the conditions under which the central bank can support a cooperative solution.
More broadly, our paper’s main contribution to the game-theoretic banking literature is that
we characterize the tradeoffs between inflation, investment and fragility that plague monetary
policy, in a simple game-theoretic framework which accounts for long horizons. Moreover, we
extend research on central bank independence, by demonstrating the limits on a central bank that
attempts to achieve both low inflation and financial stability.
We proceed by modelling excessive systemic risk-taking arising from a fire-sale externality,
and then summarizing the central bank’s tradeoffs. We then model an economy with production
and banking sectors that experience exogenous, correlated shocks, which feed back to the central
bank. Subsequently, we endogenize feedback between the real economy and banking sector in a
static and dynamic game, and demonstrate how a central bank can credibly support a cooperative
4We are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing this reference.
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equilibrium with minimal fragility. A more detailed breakdown of our approach is provided in
the next subsection.
1.1. Overview of the paper
Since this paper covers a lot of ground, a brief overview to guide the reader is presented
here. To establish a theoretical framework, in Section 2 we present a general form of the
fragility-investment tradeoff, in which banks’ investment decisions affect the likelihood of sys-
temic events. This negative externality is not internalized by individual banks, and the resulting
excessive aggregate investment in the banking sector increases systemic risk.
We further develop this idea in Section 3 by modeling excessive systemic risk-taking arising
from a fire-sale externality, building on Kashyap and Stein (2012). We proceed in two steps.
First, we describe the basic setup, where banks are financing long term projects with a mixture
of short and long term debt. While short term debt is cheaper, banks are exposed to liquidity risks
when they need to roll over the debt. If creditors refuse to roll over the debts in the intermediate
term, there will be bank failures and banks will have to engage in fire sales, thereby liquidating
premature projects. This fire-sale cost increases with the total assets on sale in the market, but
individual banks do not internalize such costs when they make their initial investment decisions,
which leads to excessive investment. The market equilibrium thus features excessive financial
fragility and inefficiently high social welfare costs from fire sales. Second, we motivate the
central bank’s tradeoff between financial fragility, output, and price stability. To start with, we
formalize this scenario with a production sector and banking sector that experience exogenous
output shocks and liquidity shocks, respectively, where these two shocks are potentially corre-
lated. A social welfare maximizing central bank therefore faces dual tradeoffs between financial
fragility and inflation, when setting short term rates to stabilize output. The covariance of real
and financial shocks reflects a feedback effect that directly affects the central bank’s expected
loss. In Section 3, such feedback effect is taken as exogenous.
In Section 4 we present an extended model, where we explicitly model the feedback between
the real economy and banking sector, accounting for banks’ strategic response to monetary pol-
icy. We proceed in three steps. First, we present the basic framework, with banks that invest in
firms’ capital via short- and long-term debt as before. In this framework, an intermediate output
shock to real economy affects bank returns, making debt refinancing feasible. When the central
bank sets short term interest rates to cushion an output shock, it affects both output and financial
fragility. Second, the changing output level implies a change in banks’ profit level, affecting their
ability to refinance. Moreover, the short-term interest rate set by the central bank changes banks’
refunding costs, which in turn changes the probability of bank failure. When there are more bank
failures, more firms need to be liquidated, thus generating a loss in aggregate output. The key
insight from Section 4 is that this feedback effect presents the central bank with a huge dilemma:
when the policy rate needs to be raised to cool down an overheated economy, the central bank
cannot raise the rate too high because that would increase the number of bank failures. Banks
understand the central bank’s dilemma, and therefore from the start of the game engage in ex-
cessive investment, which increases equilibrium financial fragility. Third, at the end of Section
4, we analyze the central bank’s problem in an infinitely repeated game. We show in the longer
run how the central bank can restrict banks’ aggregate investment, lower financial fragility and
restore the first best solution by adhering to the socially optimal interest rate. The deviating bank-
ing sector will be punished by the central bank’s best response, and we characterize the range of
central bank discount rates that ensures this cooperative solution.
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1.2. A dual policy tradeoff
Modern central banks have tended to focus on one policy tool during normal times, the in-
terbank interest rate r. However, central banks face a variety of policy objectives. For the pur-
poses of this paper, we consider three policy objectives–inflation, employment or investment,
and financial stability. Since these objectives often conflict, the central bank faces a dual policy
tradeoff.
The first tradeoff, between inflation and unemployment, is well documented and understood.
This basic tradeoff is known as the Phillips curve, first documented by Phillips (1958), then
placed in a micro-founded setting by Lucas (1972) and Woodford (2003). The Phillips curve’s
ramifications for central bank policy are examined by Barro and Gordon (1983). The second
tradeoff, between investment and financial stability, has only been recently analyzed, see Cao
and Illing (2015); Chollete and Jaffee (2012); and Kashyap and Stein (2012). The crux of this
tradeoff is that an interest rate policy which encourages investment has an externality effect of
excess credit supply, which in turn increases financial instability. In this paper we analyze both
tradeoffs from the perspective of the central bank.
1.3. Contributions
Our paper contributes to the literature on game theoretic analysis of optimal monetary policy
by formalizing the investment fragility tradeoff faced by a central bank. We then characterize
the dual tradeoff from inflation-investment-fragility that plagues monetary policy, in a simple
static game. Finally, we extend our results to a dynamic game setting. Our main contribution to
the game-theoretic banking literature is that we characterize the long horizon tradeoffs between
inflation, investment and fragility that plague monetary policy. In a related sense, we extend re-
search on central bank independence (e.g. Rogoff (1985)), by demonstrating that when a central
bank attempts to achieve financial stability, it is restricted in how to address inflation, and will
face nontrivial effects on financial risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 motivates the
relationship between financial fragility and investment. Section 3 motivates the central bank’s
tradeoff between fragility and investment, where the feedback between the real and financial
factors comes from the correlation of shocks. Section 4 studies an extended model that accounts
for a feedback mechanism between the real and financial sectors, and Section 5 is the conclusion.
2. Motivation for fragility-investment relation
In order to motivate the dual tradeoff approach to macroprudential policy, we need a func-
tional relation for the second tradeoff5, between fragility f and aggregate investment liabilities
I. That is, we require a simple micro-foundation for the function f = f (I). A natural way to do
this is to consider the well-documented fire-sale externality phenomena of banks: during normal
times, banks overinvest. Since every bank does this, during extreme events the whole system is
adversely affected.
5For the first tradeoff, the Phillips curve, see Phillips (1958); Lucas (1972); and Woodford (2003).
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2.1. Leverage-based fragility measure
This approach models an externality from excessive investment, as in Fisher (1933); Keynes
(1936); Allen and Gale (2007); and Kashyap and Stein (2012). We summarize the approach of
Kashyap and Stein (2012). Consider a large number of banks that play an infinitely repeated
game, in periods denoted by t, for t = 0, 1, ...∞. In order to model revelation of information
about systemic risk fragility, each period t is further subdivided into three dates t0, t1, and t2.
Every bank i holds exogenously determined equity ki, whose value is uniformly distributed over
the interval [0,K].
Banks are in the business of investing, which can funded in two ways – short term or long
term debt. Specifically, each period the representative bank has an investment opportunity, which,
during normal times, transforms investment Ii made at initial date t0 into θIi two dates later at t2,
for θ > 1. During extreme periods, investment yields no profit, and θ = 0. In order to fund Ii,
bank i may issue an amount mIi of short-term debt and (1 − m)Ii of long-term debt. The gross
interest rates on these two types of debts are r1 and r1 + δ, respectively. Therefore the bank’s
costs in normal times are mIir1 + (1 − m)Ii(r1 + δ) = Ii(r1 + δ − mδ), implying net profits of
Ii(θ − r1 − δ + mδ).
At date t1 there is a public signal of the t2 return from investment. With probability 1 − p it
will be a normal state in t2, with investment return of θIi, while with probability p (for systemic)
it will be in the crisis state, with investment return of 0. In a normal state, debtors will roll over
the banks’ debt, while in a crisis state, debtors refuse to roll over debt. A bank goes bankrupt if
its equity value ki is less than the value of short term debt mIi at date t1. Since ki is uniformly
distributed over [0,K] the probability that bank i will fail is simply mI
i
K . For simplicity, the
likelihood of systemic risk is assumed to be linear in aggregate investment I ≡ ∑i Ii. Similarly,
the cost Ci that each bankrupt firm imposes on society is also linear, Ci = γ · ∑i Ii, for γ > 0.
Under the insolvency of bank i, its entire assets will be sold at a depressed price p, which applies
to all other banks’ assets and implies a cost for bank i of Ci = γ
∑
i Ii. Thus bank i’s costs during
extreme periods are given by pmI
iγ
∑
Ii
K .
Such a fire-sale externality implies that each bank does not internalize the cost it imposes on
the other banks when it fails. The problem for bank i at the beginning of period t, date t0 is to
maximize expected profit Πi:
max
Ii
Πi = Ii(θ − r1 − δ + mδ) − pmI
iγ
∑
i Ii
K
. (1)
The solution to (1) is given by
Ic = (θ − r1 − δ + mδ) Kpmγ , (2)
where the c denotes the competitive outcome, and we remove superscript i for simplicity. The
socially optimal value maximizes joint profits
∑
i Π
i =
∑
i Ii(θ − r1 − δ + mδ) − pmI
iγ
∑
i Ii
K . The
corresponding optimal investment6 is given by
Ip = (θ − r1 − δ + mδ) K2pmγ , (3)
6For further details, see p. 272 of Kashyap and Stein (2012).
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where p denotes a Pareto optimum. Similar to the results in the above subsection, the competitive
level of investment Ic exceeds the optimum Ip.
Fragility Measure f . In this framework, financial fragility f is represented by the probability
of bankruptcy due to excess leverage. With a continuum of competitive banks, this probability is
the mass of banks with capital less than mIc, that is, mI
c
K . We therefore define our main fragility
measure f as below.
Definition 1 The leverage-based fragility measure is f (I) = mIK .
We summarize the relevance of the fragility measures in Proposition 1, and the inefficiencies
that motivate central bank intervention in Proposition 2, below.
Proposition 1 In a competitive banking system, financial fragility f can be represented as a
function of equilibrium aggregate bank investment I =
∑
i Ii.
Proposition 2 In a competitive banking system with fire-sale externalities, the leverage-based
fragility f is inefficiently high.
Now that we have established the concept of financial fragility, we utilize it in the remainder
of the paper in a game theoretic setup.
3. Modelling tradeoffs between fragility, investment and output
In this section we develop a simple model to establish a theoretical framework, and through-
out we focus on describing the second, financial fragility tradeoff. As a first step, the linkage
between financial sector and real economy is established by the correlation between financial
and technological shocks. The explicit macro-finance feedback mechanism will be further de-
veloped in the succeeding section. Since the first tradeoff of unemployment and inflation is well
understood, we utilize existing results from that literature directly. The setting is standard, where
the central bank knows the payoff functions of banks.7 The central bank interacts with banks
and entrepreneurs, and plays the game repeatedly. Such repetitions are cumbersome to represent,
hence we simplify compute by focusing on a stage game, which is a one-shot version of the
repeated game. If the full game is played T times, then the payoff for each player is simply the
discounted sum of the payoffs in each stage game.
Notation. This paper uses several types of notation in the next section. In order to ease the
reader’s understanding of the paper, we present below the most frequently used parameters and
symbols.
• a: Cost to central bank of missing inflation or interest target
• b: Cost to central bank of missing investment target
• β: Phillips curve-based cost to central bank of missing interest target
• pi∗: Target inflation rate
• φ: The inverse of the rate of risk aversion
• I∗: Socially optimal level of investment
• K: Total equity in the banking system
7For earlier work, see Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983). For details on repeated games,
see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991); Gibbons (1992); and Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
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• γ: Multiplier for systemic costs relative to I, which measures fire-sale costs
• m: Fraction of short-term debt in banking system, which measures system illiquidity
• εy: Output shock
• G
(
E
[
εi∗y
]
, rˆ
)
: The number of banks that are expected to fail
3.1. A base model without feedback effects
First, banks and companies form expectations of financial fragility, fˆ , and inflation, pˆi, re-
spectively. Second, the policymaker assesses expectations and chooses the actual fragility f and
inflation pi. Banks and companies receive payoffs of −( f − fˆ )2 and −(pi − pˆi)2, respectively. That
is, banks (companies) desire to anticipate fragility (inflation) as accurately as possible, achieving
their maximal payoff when f = fˆ (pi = pˆi). It is the policymaker’s desire for fragility, inflation,
and output to close to target levels, f ∗, pi∗ and y∗.
The policymaker’s loss function is defined as
min
pi
L = (y − y∗)2 + a (pi − pi∗)2 + b [ f (I) − f ∗]2 , (4)
where a > 0 and b > 0 reflect costs to the central bank of missing its targets. All terms in (4)
depend on the inflation rate pi, in a manner that we now make explicit via the inflation-output and
fragility-investment tradeoffs, below. The inflation-output relationship is defined by the Phillips
curve,
y = y + β
(
pi − pˆi + εy
)
, (5)
where β > 0, and εy is a zero-mean shock to output, εy ∼ [0, σ2y], and the relationship between
real interest rate and output is charaterized by the standard IS curve8
y = −φ (r1 − pi) + y. (6)
We model the relationship between financial investment and the short-term interest rate by
building on the Kashyap and Stein (2012) specification, from equation (2) above:
I =
(
θ − r1 − δ + mδ + ε f
) K
pmγ
.
Note that, unlike Kashyap and Stein (2012), we account for random financial shocks via the
term ε f , E[ε f ] = 0. The covariance matrix V for εy and ε f is of the form V =
[
σ2y ρy, f
ρy, f σ
2
f
]
.
Financial fragility is defined as the cost of a fire sale, namely f (I) =
(
θ − r1 − δ + mδ + ε f
)
K
pm .
And the socially optimal financial fragility f ∗ is f ∗ = γI∗ = γ
(
θ − r1 − δ + mδ + ε f
)
K
2pmγ , or
f ∗ =
(
θ − r − δ + mδ + ε f
) K
2pm
. (7)
8Motivated by Clarida et al. (1999).
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Therefore, the central bank’s decision problem in (4) can be rewritten in terms of pi, using (5),
(6), and (7), as
min
pi
L =
[
y + β
(
pi − pˆi + εy
)
− y∗
]2
+ a (pi − pi∗)2 + b
[(
θ − r1 − δ + mδ + ε f
) K
2pm
]2
. (8)
This objective is solved in Appendix A to yield expressions for optimal inflation rate, denoted
by pic, and output y:
pic =
1
B
[
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ +
(
θ +
y − y
φ
− δ + mδ
)
C
]
− 1
A
[
β2εy −Cε f
]
(9)
and
y = y +
β
A
(
Bεy + Cε f
)
, (10)
where the coefficients A, B and C capture the relative weights attached to various forms of over-
or undershooting: A = a + β2 + b
(
K
2pm
)2
, B = a + b
(
K
2pm
)2
, and C = b
(
K
2pm
)2
.
The expected welfare loss E[Ln] is also computed in Appendix B, to be
E[Ln] = (y − y∗)2 + a
−β (y − y∗) + (θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ − pi∗)C
B

2
+C
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ + a(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)
B

2
+
B2 + β2(a + C)
A2
β2σ2y
+
(a + β2)2(C2 + C)
A2
σ2f + 2Cβ
2 B + β
2
A2
ρy, f .
where σ2y , σ
2
f and ρy, f are the real shock variance, financial shock variance, and correlation of the
two shocks, respectively. In contrast, the cooperative, expected welfare loss E[Lc] under perfect
anchoring is computed in the Appendix to be
E[Lc]. = E
(y − y∗ + βεy)2 + ( K2pmε f
)2 = (y − y∗)2 + β2σ2y + Cb σ2f .
Comments on the solution. Two aspects of the above solutions appear cogent. First, the
volatility of shocks to both the financial and real sectors matter for optimal loss of the central
bank. Second, and perhaps more novel, the covariance of real and financial shocks, ρy, f , directly
affects the central bank’s expected loss. In particular, it is not enough for the central bank to
focus on real or financial shocks: it must also identify the dependence between real and financial
shocks. We summarize this latter observation in a proposition, below.
Proposition 3: In a dual tradeoff model, the central bank’s expected loss increases monoton-
ically with the dependence between financial and real shocks.
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3.2. Explanatory power and novel implications
By establishing a macro-finance linkage through correlation between financial and real shocks,
our theoretical model provides a simple method to incorporate financial and real considerations,
simultaneously, in a tractable form for central bank policy. It also offers a potential explanation
of several interesting phenomena. In particular, a large, positive real economy shock εy shifts the
production function up and raises marginal productivity. Since marginal productivity determines
marginal return on capital, banks increase their supply of credit. Consequently real shocks have
financial effects, and our model explains the empirically observed procyclicality of credit.
Similarly, a large negative financial shock ε f reduces the amount of credit I that banks sup-
ply. This, in turn, reduces firms’ investment and therefore results in output contraction. Hence,
our model explains the empirically observed occasional spillovers from financial crises to the
real economy. These spillovers will be exacerbated, the larger the correlation between real and
financial shocks.
Implications. Our model also has some novel implications. In particular, it suggests a dual
tradeoff between enhancing economic output and maintaining financial fragility. The reason is
that the central bank’s policy instrument r1, the short rate, relates positively to the inflation rate
as in the IS curve but negatively in the financial credit supply, equation (2). Central banks will
experience the bite of this tradeoff, the larger the correlation between real and financial shocks.
Potential policy tools. In light of the above analysis, effective policy instruments in the face
of this dual tradeoff must reduce real-financial correlations ρy, f . One possible approach is for
central banks to market correlation-indexed bonds, i.e. securities that are indexed to the level
of dependence between the real and financial sector. While these securities are appealing from
a theoretical perspective, the central bank would first require accurate measures of dependence.
One possibility is to utilize robust multivariate dependence measures (Joe (1997), Nelsen (1998))
such as those explored by Patton (2006) and Chollete et al. (2009).
4. A model with feedback between banks and firms
Thus far, we have modelled a simple link between banks and firms, via the correlation of
shocks, ρ f ,y. More realistically, banks create credit I that firms use to produce real output y.
Hence the central bank’s choice of interest rate r affects bank credit, which affects real output. In
turn, the real output is observed, which affects the central bank’s choice of interest rate. In this
section, we attempt to build a mechanism that captures such dual direction feedback.
Feedback from the real economy to the financial sector, or, business driven credit cycles. Our
framework allows us to account for feedback from the real economy, because the banking sector
decide the amount of credit I available depending on its expected marginal return. This marginal
return, θ from the Kashyap and Stein (2012) specification, is equal in competitive markets to the
marginal productivity of capital in the real economy.9
Feedback from financial sector to the real economy, or, credit driven business cycles. This
framework also allows us to capture the other direction of the feedback, which is less well under-
stood in existing literature. It endogenously accounts for the real effect of financial instability,
since it reduces I via fire sales. In turn, the reduced I decreases real output.
9This approach is similar to the credit transmission channel of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), known as financial
accelerators, on which a large share of the current literature on macro-finance linkages is based.
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𝑡"	 𝑡#	 𝑡$	
Bank 𝑖 provides credit 𝐼' to firms,
based on its expectation of central 
bank’s choice on inflation rate 𝜋; 
The credit 𝐼' is financed by both
short term and long term debt 
contract, with interest rates  𝑟# and𝑟# + 𝛿, respectively;
The firms use the credit to buy 
capital input, and start production. 
The shock to the production sector 𝜀- gets revealed;
The central bank decides the new 
inflation rate 𝜋., based on the
shock, inflation, and cost of 
bankruptcies in the financial sector; 
The bank gets bankrupt if its equity 
value becomes negative, and its 
assets are sold at depressed price; 
If the bank survives, it repays the 
existing short-term debt contracts, 
and rolls over part of the debts by 
issuing new short-term debts with 
interest rate 𝑟. under 𝜋..
The surviving banks get return from 
its investment on the firms, and 
repay both the short and long term 
debt contracts; 
The failed banks get dissolved, and 
debts cleared. 
Figure 1: Timeline of events in the model
We therefore revisit the Phillips curve and financial investment equations from the previous
section. In light of the above observations, we propose to account for a macro-finance linkage
via the standard Phillips curve, that the aggregate output y is given by
y = y + β
(
pi − pˆi + εy
)
, (11)
where y denotes the natural rate of output, and firms’ output is produced from the capital input
which comes from banks’ credit supply, I, as well as the standard IS curve
y = −φ (r1 − pi) + y.
We retain our previous specification of the relationship between financial investment and the
short-term interest rate from Section 3 above:
I =
(
θ(y) − r1 − δ + mδ + ε f
) K
pmγ
. (12)
Hence the financial sector and real sector are linked in three ways. First, as discussed above,
the two equations (11) and (12) are linked via the function θ(y), which represents the marginal
return on bank capital in (12), and is determined by the marginal product of y from equation (11).
Second, they are linked by the available credit for investment I, which is a component of real
output. Finally, they are linked via the short rate r1, which is set by the central bank in response
to output shock y.
4.1. Formalization of the model
Consider a large number of banks and firms that play an infinitely repeated game with a
central bank, in periods denoted t, for t = 0, 1, . . . ,+∞. Each period t is further subdivided into
three dates t0, t1, and t2. The timing of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
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Stage t0: Each bank i decides its loan or credit supply Ii to firms, given its expectation on
the future inflation rate pˆi (hence the central bank’s short-term (one-period) policy rate rˆ) and the
firms’ expected output. To finance Ii, bank i may issue an amount mIi of short-term debt and
(1 − m)Ii of long-term debt, the later of which lives from t0 to t2. The short-term debt is rolled
over at t1 with expected rate rˆ. With similar notation to the previous section, the gross interest
rates on these two types of debt are r1 and r1 +δ, respectively, where compounding yields r1 = rˆ2.
The firms use the loan Ii as an input. The return from the bank’s investment in firms, θ,
is determined by the expected aggregate output E[y], and θ
(
E
[
y
])
is an increasing function of
E
[
y
]
. The bank’s expected costs are therefore C (m, r1) = mIir1 + (1 − m)Ii (r1 + δ), implying
expected net profits of θ(E
[
y
]
)Ii −C (m, r1), if it survives till t2. Without much loss of generality,
assume that θ
(
E
[
y
])
= ωE
[
y
]
.
Stage t1: At t1 there is a publicly observed signal of the aggregate shock on date t2’s return
from firms. The shock is denoted by εy ∼ N
(
0, σ2εy
)
. After the shock, the central bank sets its
inflation rate piE , based on its loss function:
min
piE
L = (y − y∗)2 + a
(
piE − pi∗
)2 − γ∑
i
IiG
(
E
[
εi∗y
]
, rˆ
)
,
where the superscript E denotes equilibrium. The term G
(
E
[
εi∗y
]
, rˆ
)
denotes the number of
banks expected to fail, which depends on both real and monetary shocks, as explained later in
this section. This policy rate will affect aggregate output at t2. Actual output is determined by
the input I, subject to price stickiness. We define this inflation-output relationship by the Phillips
curve
y
(
piE , εy
)
= y + β
(
piE − pˆi + εy
)
and the goods market is cleared by the IS curve
y
(
piE , εy
)
= −φ
(
rE − piE
)
+ y
where rE is the monetary policy rate through which the central bank implements piE .
The investment under natural output y is denoted by I. In a state when the bank’s return is
higher than rE , debtors will roll over banks’ debt, while in other states, debtors refuse to roll over
debt. The bank fails if its equity value ki (uniformly distributed on [0,K]) is less than the value
of short term debt mIi net the expected value of its assets at date t2. If the bank fails, all of its
assets will liquidated in a fire sale, subject to the fire sale cost.
Stage t2: If the bank survives, the firms will repay the loans, and its debtors withdraw.
The equilibrium of the model is featured by the following set of functions:
(1) Given piE , the firms’ aggregate output at t2 is y
(
piE , εy
)
, implying that the gross return to
the bank’s investment is θ = ωy
(
piE , εy
)
.
At t1, the bank will fail if mIirˆrE + (1 − m) Ii (r1 + δ) − ωyIi > ki. Define yi∗ and εi∗y such
that mIirˆrE + (1 − m) Ii (r1 + δ) − ωyi∗Ii = ki, and yi∗ = y + β
(
pi − pˆi + εi∗y
)
. Then the ex post
probability that the bank will fail is G
(
εi∗y
)
.
(2) If the bank fails at t1, its assets will be sold at the depressed price. The fire sale cost is
γ
∑
i Ii.
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At t0 the bank’s optimal decision on investment is determined by maximizing its profit
max
Ii
LiB = ω(E
[
y
]
)Ii −C (m, r1) − γ
∑
i
IiG
(
E
[
εi∗y
]
, rˆ
)
,
where the B superscript denotes the bank, G
(
E
[
εi∗y
]
, rˆ
)
denotes the ex ante probability of insol-
vency, and rational expectations imply that pˆi = E
[
piE
]
.
At stage t0 the following relation holds: ω(E
[
y
]
) = ωE
[
y + β
(
pi − pˆi + εy
)]
= ωI, where I is
the aggregate credit supply, taken as given for each individual bank.
Given the bank’s expectations for central bank policy, pˆi, the bank’s expected probability of
becoming insolvent10 at t1 is G
(
E
[
εi∗y
]
, rˆ
)
=
mIi rˆ2+(1−m)Ii(r1+δ)−ωIIi
K . Therefore, the bank’s optimal
decision problem at t0 is
max
Ii
LiB = ωII
i − mIir1 − (1 − m)Ii (r1 + δ) − γ
∑
i
Ii
mIirˆ2 + (1 − m) Ii (r1 + δ) − ωIIi
K
.
Note that since we are in a two period model, the short rate rˆ and long rate r1 are related by
r1 = rˆ2.
Bank’s competitive equilibrium outcome IE . Under the above assumptions, the bank’s first
order condition yields
∂LiB
∂Ii
= ωI − mr1 − (1 − m) (r1 + δ) − γI mrˆ
2 + (1 − m) (r1 + δ) − ωI
K
= 0.
This condition is satisfied by the equilibrium investment IE such that
ωIE K − r1K − Kδ + Kmδ − γIEr1 − γIEδ + γIEmδ + γ(IE)2ω = 0, (13)
where the superscript E denotes equilibrium. However, the bank does not take into account the
fire-sale externality it imposes to the entire financial system, which leads to excessive investment.
Bank’s social optimum Ip. We now account for fire-sale externalities. If a planner forces
the bank to consider fire-sale costs, the bank will solve the following decision problem:
max
Ip
LpB = ω(E
[
y(Ip)
]
)Ip −C (m, r1) − γ
∑
i
IpG
(
εi∗y , rˆ
)
(i) ,
where the superscript p denotes planner. This maximization problem can be rewritten
max
Ip
LpB = ω(I
p)2 − mIpr1 − (1 − m)Ip (r1 + δ) − γIp mI
prˆ2 + (1 − m) Ip (r1 + δ) − ω(Ip)2
K
.
The first order condition yields
∂LpB
∂Ip
= 2ωIp − mr1 − (1 − m) (r1 + δ) − 2γI
pmrˆ2 + 2γIp (1 − m) (r1 + δ) − 3γω(Ip)2
K
= 0,
10Our formulation of G(·) therefore generalizes the Kashyap and Stein (2012) framework, since the short rate enters
G(·). This formalizes the notion that the central bank can affect the likelihood of default.
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or the Ip such that
2IpωK − r1K − Kδ + Kmδ − 2Ipγr1 − 2Ipγδ + 2Ipγmδ + 3(Ip)2γω = 0. (14)
As summarized in Proposition 4 below, the bank’s equilibrium investment is larger than the
social optimum, the latter of which accounts for excess fragility.
Proposition 4: Inefficiency of bank’s competitive equilibrium investment
Part A: In market equilibrium, the bank’s investment is larger than the planner’s solution,
i.e., IE > Ip. Moreover,
√
3Ip < IE < 2Ip.
Part B: In market equilibrium, liquidity risk provides some market discipline, but investment
is still excessive.
Part A is straightforward, and provides an upper-bound on the magnitude of over-investment.
Part B of the proposition says that a higher share of short-term debt (higher m) reduces banks’
investment. Equivalently, liquidity risk restricts banks’ risk-taking in the market equilibrium,
thereby providing some market discipline. Nevertheless, due to the fire-sale externality, market
discipline is not sufficient. Compared with the planner’s solution, the competitive equilibrium
still features excessive investment.
Central bank’s decision. We now derive the central bank’s optimal strategy for short rates.
To establish the theoretical framework, we focus on the case where banks choose the fragility-
based excessive credit supply IE solved above11. The central bank’s optimal decision at t1, after
observing εy, is to solve the following program:
min
piE
LC = (y − y∗)2 + a
(
piE − pi∗
)2
+ bγ
∑
i
IiG
(
εi∗y
)
(i) ,
where the subscript C denotes the central bank, subject to the Phillips curve and the IS curve.
From the Appendix C, the central bank’s optimal inflation rate piE is proved to satisfy
piE =
2aK
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
pi∗ +
2βφK
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
(y∗ − y) +
mbγ
(
IE
)2
2aφK + bφγ(IE)2m
(
IE − I
)
(15)
+
bγ
(
IE
)2
ωβ
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
− β
2
a + β2
εy.
The solution for piE in (15) can be related to extant models. For example, as in Barro and
Gordon (1983), piE should partially respond to demand shocks, which is intuitive. There are,
however, some important differences between piE and the short rate obtained by a traditional
central bank concerned with inflation targeting. We discuss these differences below.
4.2. Implications for macroprudential policy
In conventional inflation-targeting frameworks, the central bank’s decision problem does not
account for fire sales. Specifically, the central bank’s problem is
11Given the symmetric structure of the problem, the central bank will solve the same program when banks supply the
socially optimal credit Ip, except that everywhere in the program it would replace IE with Ip.
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min
pi0
L = (y − y∗)2 + a
(
pi0 − pi∗
)2
,
subject to the Phillips curve
y
(
pi0, εy
)
= y + β
(
pi0 − pˆi + εy
)
in which pi0 is the inflation set by a pure inflation targeting central bank. The first order condition
yields
∂L
∂pi0
= 2β
[
y − y∗ + β
(
pi0 − pˆi + εy
)]
+ 2a
(
pi0 − pi∗
)
= 0,
or
pi0 =
api∗ + β (y∗ − y) + β2pˆi − β2εy
a + β2
.
The consistency condition E
[
pi0
]
= pˆi implies that pˆi = E
[
pi0
]
= E
[
api∗+β(y∗−y)+β2pˆi−β2εy
a+β2
]
=
api∗+β(y∗−y)+β2pˆi
a+β2 , or pˆi = pi
∗ + βa (y
∗ − y). By substituting this condition into the expression for pi0, we
obtain the optimal inflation rate pi0 for an inflation-targeting central bank:
pi0 = pi∗ +
β
a
(y∗ − y) − β
2
a + β2
εy. (16)
Recall that for a central bank which takes financial stability into account, the optimal short
rate rE from (15) satisfies
piE =
2aK
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
pi∗ +
2βK
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
(y∗ − y) +
mbγ
(
IE
)2
2aφK + bφγ(IE)2m
(
IE − I
)
+
bγ
(
IE
)2
ωβ
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
− β
2
a + β2
εy.
Observations on the solution. By comparing the solution for pi0 in (16) to the one for
piE above, we can see the role of financial stability in the central bank’s decision making. In
particular, we discern two effects.
The first is a discipline effect: in the first two terms of piE , 2aK2aK+bγ(IE )2m < 1 and
2βK
2aK+bγ(IE )2m <
β
a , which indicates that the central bank is cautious in stimulating the economy, in order to re-
strict excessive investment. This effect is in line with suggestions by John Taylor and others, who
argued after the 2008 global financial crisis that a central bank which is concerned about finan-
cial stability should be more aggressive (relative to what the Taylor rule suggests) in containing
inflation in normal times, in order to deter build-up of financial imbalances. Here we do see such
an incentive.
The second is the stability effect: in the following terms of piE , mbγ(I
E)2
2aφK+bφγ(IE )2m
(
IE − I
)
+
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bγ(IE)2ωβ
2aK+bγ(IE )2m > 0, which indicates that the central bank’s “stability target” inflation rate should
be higher, once it cares about financial fragility. Thus, the central bank has the incentive to over-
heat the economy in order to increase the return and reduce the insolvency risk in the banking
sector.
More broadly, these findings extend the literature on central bank independence (e.g. Rogoff
(1985)). This literature argues that in order to achieve price stability, monetary policy should be
delegated to a “conservative” central bank that only cares about inflation or, in the context of our
model, a→ +∞. In such a case, our model implies the following condition: lima→+∞ pi0 = piE =
pi∗.
What does our solution imply about dynamics? There is obviously the potential for moral
hazard. If banks have a systematical expectation on loose monetary policy and higher Ii at t0, the
central bank will be, ex post, forced to follow a loose monetary policy if it has a low discount
factor. We discuss this issue further in the repeated game formulation below.
4.3. An impossibility result
Our framework may be valuable to clarify the limitations on central banking imposed by
attempts to control both inflation and fragility. Intuitively, the only time a central bank’s dual
targets of inflation control and stability are compatible is when the inflation rates piE and pi0 are
equal. The central bank can use the same rate to control both inflation and targeting only if
piE − pi0 is identically zero. We solve this condition in the Appendix, which yields the following
proposition:
Proposition 5: General impossibility of both fragility control and inflation commitment.
Even if a central bank is independent, it is generally unable to control simultaneously fragility
and inflation. Such control is only possible in the knife-edge case of pi∗ = βa (y
∗ − y)+ 1
φ
(
IE − I
)
+
ωβ
m , i.e., where the target inflation rate is a specific linear function of the output gap and the
investment gap.
4.4. Infinitely repeated game
Now consider the following infinitely repeated version of the game above. One solution
above sets the vector [IE , piE] such that, given banks’ expectations, the marginal cost and benefits
to the central bank from surprise investment offset each other. This outcome is subgame perfect,
since the central bank is expected to allow a positive amount of fragility and indeed does so.
However, the central bank would be better off if it could commit to a socially optimal scenario of
pip (where pip , piE) that results in the optimal credit supply Ip. This is an inherent inconsistency
problem, since the policymaker and banks have an incentive to deviate from the socially optimal
investment and short rate [Ip, pip]. A simple way to assess the implications of such deviations is
to examine an infinite horizon game.
Infinite game formulation. Let policymakers, firms and banks share a common discount
factor d. To solve this game, we shall clarify the player payoffs and focus on pure strategies, then
derive conditions under which pi = pˆi = pip and I = Ip every period, in a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Payoff functions for central bank and banks. Denote the banks’ choice of credit supply in
equilibrium and under the social (planner) optimum as IE and Ip, respectively. Then the central
bank’s payoff as a function of short rates and the banks’ credit supply Ii ∈ {IE , Ip}, from the
previous section, is
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LC(pic, pˆi, Ii) =
[
(y − y∗) + β
(
pic − pˆi + εy
)]2
+ a (pic − pi∗)2 (17)
+bγIi
mIirˆrc + (1 − m) Ii (r1 + δ) − ω
[
y + β
(
pic − pˆi + εy
)]
Ii
K
,
where pic ∈ {piE , pip}. The bank’s payoff function is
LB(rˆ, Ii) = ωIIi − mIir1 − (1 − m)Ii (r1 + δ) − γ
∑
i
Ii
mIir1 + (1 − m) Ii (r1 + δ) − ωIIi
K
. (18)
We shall use the payoffs in (17) and (18) to compute optimal strategies and credible punish-
ments for deviations.
Strategies for the central bank and bank. Given a bank’s credit supply Ii ∈ {IE , Ip}, the
central bank’s optimal monetary policy, from the previous section, is given by
pii =
2aK
2aK + bγ(Ii)2m
pi∗ +
2βK
2aK + bγ(Ii)2m
(y∗ − y) +
mbγ
(
Ii
)2
2aφK + bφγ(Ii)2m
(
Ii − I
)
(19)
+
bγ
(
Ii
)2
ωβ
2aK + bγ(Ii)2m
− β
2
a + β2
εy
where pii ∈ {piE , pip}.
Also from the section 4.1 equation (13), the bank’s equilibrium strategy for investment is IE
such that the following relation holds:
ωIE K − Kr1 − Kδ + Kmδ − γIEr1 − γIEδ + γIEmδ + γ(IE)2ω = 0. (20)
By contrast, from the section 4.1 equation (14), the socially optimal investment Ip allows for
fire-sale externalities, and Ip is such that the following relation holds:
2ωIpK − Kr1 − Kδ + Kmδ − 2γIpr1 − 2γIpδ + 2γIpmδ + 3γ(Ip)2ω = 0. (21)
The central bank wishes to encourage socially optimal investment Ip defined in (21), and stop
intermediary banks from doing IE in (20). To accomplish this objective, the central bank can
choose a trigger strategy, which sets pic = pip computed from (19), as long as the intermediaries
behave and choose credit supply equal to Ip. Otherwise, the central bank assumes banks are
going to opt for their most profitable deviation of IE and sets pi equal to the best response piE ,
computed from (19). In our model, the banks’ expectations are correct on average, so IE and Ip
are in turn best responses to piE and pip, respectively. Thus the central bank’s strategy is supported
in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The repeated game involves evaluating stage game payoffs to various strategies from the
central bank and bank. These payoffs may be represented in the following matrix, Table 1. In
Table 1, LpC(·) denotes the central bank’s payoff in the socially optimal setting (where financial
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Table 1: Stage game payoffs to central bank and intermediary bank
Bank
Cooperate: pi = pip Deviate: pi = piE
Central bank Cooperate: I = Ip (LpC , L
p
B) (L˜
E
C , L˜
E
B)
Deviate: I = IE (L˜pC , L˜
E
B) (L
E
C , L
E
B)
fragility is minimized), and LEC(·) denotes the central bank’s payoff in the inefficient equilibrium,
where financial fragility is a problem. The tilde denotes payoffs from a deviation. Thus L˜EB is
what the bank obtains by deviating to the equilibrium investment IE .
More specifically, we consider two types of subgames that the central bank faces. The first
type is one in which banks have chosen the socially optimal credit supply Ip and the central bank
sets the inflation rate to pic in (19), for the present and for all previous periods. The second type
is any one in which intermediary banks have deviated by choosing the individually rational but
fire-sale provoking credit level IE . The central bank and intermediary bank share a common
discount factor d.
Banks: In the first period, banks hold the expectation pˆi = pip, and supply the socially optimal
credit Ip. In subsequent periods they expect pˆi = pip, if and only if all prior credit supply was Ip
and inflation rates were actually pip. Otherwise, bank expectations pˆi are set equal to piE , which
we defined as optimal for the central bank if it wants to punish banks for excess credit supply in
the stage game.
Central Bank: The central bank chooses pi = pip if and only if current bank and firm ex-
pectations satisfy pˆi = pip, all previous expectations have been pˆi = pip, and all previous actual
investment and short rates have been Ip and rp. Otherwise, the central bank assumes banks are
building up excess credit IE and chooses pic = piE from its best response (19).
Infinite game equilibrium. Let banks’ first-period expectations be pˆi = pip. Further, as in
Table 1, let the central bank’s loss function be LpC(pi
p, Ip). Now, given the bank’s strategy, the
central bank can focus on two possible paths of financial fragility. The first path involves pˆi = pip,
which results the next period in pˆi = pip and Ip. Consequently the central bank makes the same
decision in the next period. The second alternative involves expectations pˆi = piE and credit
supply I = IE . This results in (IE , piE) forever.
The payoffs from these two strategies are as follows: The first strategy (pi = pip in this period),
yields the central bank a payoff of LpC(pi
p, Ip) forever, for a total of 11−d L
p
C(pi
p, Ip). The second
strategy (pi = piE this period) yields the central bank L˜pC(pi
p, Ip) this period, then LEC(pi
E , IE)
forever, for a total of L˜pC(pi
p, Ip) + d1−d L
E
C(pi
E , IE). Therefore the central bank’s strategy is a best
response to the banks’ strategy if the following condition holds: 11−d L
p
C(pi
p, Ip) ≥ L˜pC(pip, Ip) +
d
1−d L
E
C(pi
E , IE). This condition can be rewritten as
d ≥ L˜
p
C(pi
p, Ip) − LpC(pip, Ip)
L˜pC(pi
p, Ip) − LEC(piE , IE)
≡ d, (22)
which has a ready economic implication. Economically speaking, the central bank finds it op-
timal not to deviate from its commitment to minimize future financial fragility, if and only if
its discount rate (i.e., its willingness to sacrifice present pain for future gain from enforcing low
fragility) is large enough, larger than the threshold d.
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Figure 2: Threshold discount rate for infinite-horizon game. The figure shows the threshold discount rate d from equation
(22). The calibration is as in Appendix D. The parameters a and b denote the central bank’s weight on inflation and
fragility, respectively.
In order to illustrate our results visually, we depict the threshold discount rate d, aggregate
investment I, and the optimal inflation rate in traditional and fragility-based settings, i.e., equa-
tions (20) and (21), respectively. This communicates the difference between our approach and
previous research in an intuitive manner.
Details of our calibration are in the Appendix D. The surface for the threshold discount rate
is displayed in Figure 2. Intuitively, d is more likely to be below 1 when the weight of finan-
cial stability gets higher in the central bank’s loss function. We show results of our investment
calibration in Figure 3. Evidently investment is too low and unresponsive when the central bank
only targets inflation. Figure 4 displays the optimal inflation rate for a central bank that cares
about fragility or only inflation. The upper flat surface shows that the optimal inflation rate is un-
responsive to fragility concerns, which is straightforward. The lower curved surface corresponds
to a relatively large m (illiquidity). It is lower than the case (upper curved surface) of small m,
indicating attenuation of optimal inflation rates in the case of a highly illiquid financial sector. In
sum, the calibration results are quite reasonable. Nevertheless, we do not place much emphasis
on this aspect of the paper, since our focus is to illustrate, in a tractable theoretical framework,
the forces at work when a central bank faces the dual tradeoffs of inflation and fragility.
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Figure 3: Aggregate investment with fragility-conscious central bank. The figure shows the average investment surface
from equations (13) and (14). The calibration is as in Appendix D. The parameters a and b denote the central bank’s
weight on inflation and fragility, respectively. The curved surfaces correspond to equation (14), and show the optimal
investment when the central bank targets both inflation and fragility – the upper curved surface corresponds to m = 0.4
while the lower curved surface corresponds to m = 0.6. The bottom surface corresponds to equation (13), and shows the
optimal investment when the central bank only targets inflation.
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Figure 4: Optimal inflation rates under traditional targeting and fragility concerns. The figure shows the optimal inflation
rates pi0 and piE from equations (16) and (15). The calibration is as in Appendix D. The parameters a and b denote the
central bank’s weight on inflation and fragility, respectively. The curved surfaces correspond to equation (15), and depict
the optimal inflation rate when the central bank targets both inflation and fragility – the light corresponds to m = 0.4,
while the dark corresponds to m = 0.6. The top surface corresponds to equation (16), and shows the optimal inflation
when the central bank only targets inflation.
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5. Conclusions
We develop a framework that characterizes central banks’ dual tradeoff between financial
stability and inflation control. Since our approach focuses on strategic interaction, it is comple-
mentary to recent research on financial fragility that is based on dynamic general equilibrium and
related frameworks. We analyze two models: a base model where there is no feedback, and an
extended model with feedback effects between the real and financial sectors. The base model of-
fers a potential explanation of several interesting phenomena. In particular, a large, positive real
economy shock shifts the production function upward and raises marginal productivity. Since
marginal productivity determines the marginal return on capital, banks increase their supply of
credit. Consequently real shocks have financial effects, and our model explains the empirically
observed procyclicality of credit. Similarly, a large negative financial shock reduces the credit
banks supply. This, in turn, reduces firms’ investment and therefore results in output contraction.
Hence, our model explains the empirically observed occasional spillovers from financial crises
to the real economy. These spillovers will be more prominent, the larger the correlation between
real and financial shocks.
In the extended model, we account for both intermediaries’ and central banks’ incentives
to deviate from appropriate bailout, liquidity, and interest rate targets. Our model introduces a
novel tradeoff between enhancing economic output and maintaining financial stability. Central
banks will experience the bite of this tradeoff, the larger the correlation between real and finan-
cial shocks. Specifically, tight monetary policy deters buildup of financial imbalances, but loose
monetary policy reduces the likelihood of insolvency. We term these factors the discipline effect
and stability effect, respectively. We show that the central bank’s welfare loss increases with
dependence between the real and financial shocks. Thus, a central bank may be able to reduce
tradeoff costs by marketing correlation-indexed securities. Evidently, in order to market such se-
curities, the central bank would need to estimate robust measures of dependence, perhaps related
to those explored by Patton (2006) and Chollete et al. (2009).
Our findings extend the literature on central bank independence (e.g. Rogoff (1985)). This
literature demonstrates that in order to achieve price stability, monetary policy should be dele-
gated to a conservative central bank whose sole concern is inflation. Our framework suggest a
further impossibility result: in our model, even with an independent central bank, the attainment
of both low inflation and financial stability is generally not possible. An additional financial
stability arm, such as financial supervision authority, is a necessary complementary institution to
central bank to reduce financial instability.
Appendix
A. Derivation of optimal policy response rc of Section 3.1
Recall from equation (8) that the the central bank’s decision problem is
min
pi
L =
[
y + β
(
pi − pˆi + εy
)
− y∗
]2
+ a (pi − pi∗)2 + b
[(
θ −
(
pi − y − y
φ
)
− δ + mδ + ε f
)
K
2pm
]2
.
The first-order condition is
∂L
∂pi
= 0 = 2β
[
y + β
(
pi − pˆi + εy
)
− y∗
]
+ 2a (pi − pi∗)
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+2b
[(
θ −
(
pi − y − y
φ
)
− δ + mδ + ε f
)
K
2pm
] (
− K
2pm
)
,
which can be solved to obtain the central bank’s best response, denoted pic:
pic = − 1
a + β2 + b
(
K
2pm
)2 [β (y − y∗) − β2pˆi + β2εy − api∗ (23)
−b
(
K
2pm
)2 (
θ +
y − y
φ
+ ε f
)
+ (1 − m) δb
(
K
2pm
)2
].
To compute the above expression, we require the inflation rate expectations pˆi, to which we
now turn. If expectations are on average correct in an equilibrium, then pˆi = E [pic], whence we
can derive the following relation:
pˆi = − 1
a + β2 + b
(
K
2pm
)2
β (y − y∗) − β2pˆi − api∗ − b ( K2pm
)2 (
θ +
y − y
φ
)
+ (1 − m) δb
(
K
2pm
)2 .
This expression can be simplified to
pˆi = − 1
a + b
(
K
2pm
)2
β (y − y∗) − api∗ − b ( K2pm
)2 (
θ +
y − y
φ
)
+ (1 − m) δb
(
K
2pm
)2 ,
or, equivalently,
pˆi =
1
a + b
(
K
2pm
)2
β (y∗ − y) + api∗ + (θ + y − yφ − δ + mδ
) (
K
2pm
)2
b
 . (24)
By substituting the pˆi term from (24) into (23) we obtain the equilibrium policy rate, namely,
pic = −
 1a + b ( K2pm )2
β (y − y∗) − api∗ − b ( K2pm
)2 (
θ +
y − y
φ
)
+ (1 − m) δb
(
K
2pm
)2

− 1
a + β2 + b
(
K
2pm
)2
β2εy − b
(
K
2pm
)2
ε f
 .
Now define A = a + β2 + b
(
K
2pm
)2
, B = a + b
(
K
2pm
)2
, and C = b
(
K
2pm
)2
. Then the above
expression implies
pic =
1
B
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ + b ( K2pm
)2 (
θ +
y − y
φ
)
− (1 − m) δb
(
K
2pm
)2− 1A
β2εy − b ( K2pm
)2
ε f

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or
pic =
1
B
[
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ +
(
θ +
y − y
φ
− δ + mδ
)
C
]
− 1
A
[
β2εy −Cε f
]
. (25)
Thus pic and pˆi have the following relation, pic = pˆi − 1A (β2εy −Cε f ).
We also need to obtain the term for output y. From the Phillips curve relation (5), actual
output is
y = y + β
(
pi − pˆi + εy
)
,
which upon substitution yields
y = y +
a + b
(
K
2pm
)2
a + β2 + b
(
K
2pm
)2 βεy + b
(
K
2pm
)2
a + β2 + b
(
K
2pm
)2 βε f .
And finally,
y = y +
B
A
βεy +
C
A
βε f = y +
β
A
(
Bεy + Cε f
)
. (26)
B. Derivation of expected welfare loss E[Ln] in Section 3.1
To compute this moment, we first calculate the welfare loss expression Ln, by substituting
(25) and (26) into the objective (8):
L =
[
y +
B
A
βεy +
C
A
βε f − y∗
]2
+a
[
1
B
[
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ +
(
θ +
y − y
φ
− δ + mδ
)
C
]
− 1
A
[
β2εy −Cε f
]
− pi∗
]2
+b
(
K
2pm
)2 
β (y − y∗) − api∗ + a(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)
B
+
β2εy + (a + β2)ε f
A


2
=
[
y +
B
A
βεy +
C
A
βε f − y∗
]2
+ a
−β (y − y∗) + (a − B)pi∗ + (θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)C
B
− β
2εy −Cε f
A

2
+b

B(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ) −
[
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ +
(
θ + y−y
φ
− δ + mδ
)
C
]
B
+
β2εy + (A −C)ε f
A
 K2pm

2
.
To simplify, note that (a − B)pi∗ = −Cpi∗ in the fourth line; and (B − C)(θ + y−y
φ
− δ + mδ) =
a(θ + y−y
φ
− δ+ mδ), and (A−C)ε f = (a + β2)ε f , for the fifth line. Thus we can rewrite the above
expression as
L =
[
y +
B
A
βεy +
C
A
βε f − y∗
]2
+ a
−β (y − y∗) + (θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ − pi∗)C
B
− β
2εy −Cε f
A

2
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+b
(
K
2pm
)2 
β (y − y∗) − api∗ + a(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)
B
+
β2εy + (a + β2)ε f
A


2
=
[
y +
B
A
βεy +
C
A
βε f − y∗
]2
+ a
[
(1 − α)βy∗ + (θ − δ + mδ − r∗)C
B
− β
2εy −Cε f
A
]2
+C

−−β (y − y∗) + api∗ + a(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)
B
+
β2εy + (a + β2)ε f
A


2
. (27)
Now that we have the expression for welfare loss L, we can compute its moments, which
rely on joint stochastic properties of the real and financial shocks εy and ε f . Recall that the
distribution of the shocks is the following, ε ≡ [εy, ε f ]′, then ε ∼ [0,V] where the covariance
matrix V is of the form V =
[
σ2y ρy, f
ρy, f σ
2
f
]
.
Then we can take expectations of (27). In the following, we first express the constant terms,
then the stochastic ones, i.e., those that depend on the moments of εy and ε f . Specifically,
E[L] = (y − y∗)2 + a
−β (y − y∗) + (θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ − pi∗)C
B

2
+C
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ + a(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)
B

2
+
[BA
]2
β2 + a
[
β2
A
]2
+ C
[
β2
A
]2σ2y + [CA
]2
β2 + a
[C
A
]2
+ C
[
(a + β2)
A
]2σ2f
+2
(
B
A
C
A
β2 − aβ
2
A
C
A
+ C
β2
A
(a + β2)
A
)
ρy, f
= (y − y∗)2 + a
−β (y − y∗) + (θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ − pi∗)C
B

2
+C
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ + a(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)
B

2
+
B2 + aβ2 + Cβ2
A2
β2σ2y +
C2(β2 + a) + C(a + β2)2
A2
σ2f + 2Cβ
2 B + β
2
A2
ρy, f ,
or
E[Ln] = (y − y∗)2 + a
−β (y − y∗) + (θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ − pi∗)C
B

2
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+C
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ + a(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)
B

2
+
B2 + β2(a + C)
A2
β2σ2y +
(a + β2)2(C2 + C)
A2
σ2f + 2Cβ
2 B + β
2
A2
ρy, f . (28)
In contrast, the cooperative solution features two conditions pˆi = pic = pi∗ and pi∗ = θ−(1−m)δ.
Substituting these conditions into the objective function (8) and taking expectations yields the
expected loss under perfect anchoring, we can derive E[Lc]
E[Lc] = E
(y − y∗ + βεy)2 + ( K2pmε f
)2
= (y − y∗)2 + β2σ2y +
C
b
σ2f , (29)
where the second line uses the fact that C = b
(
K
2pm
)2
. The difference in expected loss ∆ =
E[L] − E[Lc] is calculated from (28) and (29) to be
∆ = a
−β (y − y∗) + (θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ − pi∗)C
B

2
+ C
−β (y − y∗) + api∗ + a(θ +
y−y
φ
− δ + mδ)
B

2
+
B2 + β2(a + C) − A2
A2
β2σ2y +
b(a + β2)2(C2 + C) − A2C
bA2
σ2f + 2Cβ
2 B + β
2
A2
ρy, f . (30)
C. Proofs
Proposition 1
In a competitive banking system, financial fragility f can be represented as a function of
equilibrium aggregate bank investment I =
∑
i Ii.
Proof of Proposition 1: By Definition 1 in Section 2.
Proposition 2
In a competitive banking system with fire-sale externalities, the leverage-based fragility f is
inefficiently high.
Proof of Proposition 2: In a competitive banking system with fire-sale externalities, the
total investment is higher than the socially optimal level, Ic > Ip. By Definition 1 in Section 2,
f (Ic) > f (Ip).
Proposition 4: Inefficiency of bank equilibrium investment
Part A: In market equilibrium, the bank’s investment is larger than the planner’s solution,
i.e., IE > Ip. Moreover,
√
3Ip < IE < 2Ip. Part B: In market equilibrium, liquidity risk provides
some market discipline, but investment is still excessive.
Proof of Part A: Subtracting (14) from (13), one can get
γω
(
3(Ip)2 − (IE)2
)
+
(
2Ip − IE
)
(ωrˆK − γr1 − γδ + γmδ) ≡ 0.
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The banks borrow short-term debt only if long-term debt is too costly, or ω < ωIp ≤ r1 + δ.
Therefore
ωrˆK − γ (r1 + δ) + γmδ ≥ ω (rˆK − γ) + γmδ > 0
as long as rˆK − γ > 0. This latter condition is fairly weak: since rˆ > 1 > γ, the inequality strictly
holds if Ip > K > 1.
Suppose that IE < IE , then γω
(
3(Ip)2 − (IE)2
)
+
(
2Ip − IE
)
(ωrˆK − γr1 − γδ + γmδ) > 0. A
contradiction.
Suppose that Ip ≤ IE ≤ √3Ip, then γω
(
3(Ip)2 − (IE)2
)
+
(
2Ip − Ii
)
(ωrˆK − γr1 − γδ + γmδ) >
0. A contradiction.
Suppose that IE ≥ 2Ip, then γω
(
3(Ip)2 − (IE)2
)
+
(
2Ip − Ii
)
(ωrˆK − γr1 − γδ + γmδ) < 0. A
contradiction.
Therefore,
√
3Ip < IE < 2Ip.
Proof of Part B: This part of the proof involves evaluating comparative statics of the liquidity
effect. Using the implicit function theorem, we can take the derivative of (17) with respect to m
to get
∂IE
∂m
= − Kδ + γIδ
ωK − γr1 − γδ + γmδ + 2IEγω.
The denominator can be rewritten as
ωK + γ(ωIE − r1) + γ(ωIE − δ) + γmδ.
Since ωIE is the return on investment, ωIE > r1 > δ by assumption. Therefore the denomi-
nator is positive, and ∂I
E
∂m < 0. 
Derivation of optimal inflation rate piE in model of section 4.2
Recall that the central bank’s program is
min
piE
LC = (y − y∗)2 + a
(
piE − pi∗
)2
+ bγ
∑
i
IiG
(
εi∗y
)
(i) ,
subject to the Phillips curve
y = y + β
(
piE − pˆi + εy
)
and the IS curve
y = −φ
(
rE − piE
)
+ y.
For simplicity, we have assumed that bankruptcy formally occurs in the end of the period, t2.
Thus, the share of bankrupted banks can be written as
mIE rˆrE + (1 − m) IE (r1 + δ) − ω
[
y + β
(
piE − pˆi + εy
)]
IE
K
.
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The first order condition is linear in piE so that we can solve pˆi by taking expectations. The
first order condition yields
∂LC
∂piE
= 2β
[
y − y∗ + β
(
piE − pˆi + εy
)]
+ 2a
(
piE − pi∗
)
+
bγIE
K
(
mIE rˆ − ωIEβ
)
= 0.
Since in a rational expectations equilibrium E
[
piE
]
= pˆi, we take expectations on the first
order condition, in order to obtain
2β (y − y∗) + 2a (pˆi − pi∗) + bγI
E
K
mIE pˆi − IE − I
φ
 − ωIEβ = 0,
which implies that interest rate expectations satisfy
pˆi =
2aφKpi∗ + 2βφK (y∗ − y) + mbγ(IE)2
(
IE − I
)
+ bφγ(IE)2ωβ
2aφK + bφγ(IE)2m
.
We now insert pˆi into the first order condition, and solve for the central bank’s optimal short
rate to obtain
piE =
2aK
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
pi∗+
2βK
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
(y∗ − y)+
mbγ
(
IE
)2
2aφK + bφγ(IE)2m
(
IE − I
)
+
bγ
(
IE
)2
ωβ
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
− β
2
a + β2
εy,
which is presented as equation (15) of the text.
Proof of the impossibility result, Proposition 5
We have to show that when the central bank’s rates are equal, piE = pi0, then the target inflation
rate is a linear function of the investment gap: pi∗ = βa (I
E − I∗) + ωβm .
The central bank can use the same rate to control both inflation and targeting only if piE − pi0
is identically zero. We solve this condition by taking the difference piE − pi0:
piE − pi0 = 2aK2aK+bγ(IE )2mpi∗ + 2βK2aK+bγ(IE )2m (y∗ − y) +
mbγ(IE)2
2aφK+bφγ(IE )2m
(
IE − I
)
+
bγ(IE)2ωβ
2aK+bγ(IE )2m − β
2
a+β2 εy −
[
pi∗ + βa (y
∗ − y) − β2a+β2 εy
]
=
[
2aK
2aK+bγ(IE )2m − 1
]
pi∗ + β (y∗ − y)
[
2K
2aK+bγ(IE )2m − 1a
]
+
mbγ(IE)2
2aφK+bφγ(IE )2m
(
IE − I
)
+
bγ(IE)2ωβ
2aK+bγ(IE )2m
=
[
2aK−2aK−bγ(IE )2m
2aK+bγ(IE )2m
]
pi∗ + β (y∗ − y)
[
2aK−2aK−bγ(IE )2m
a[2aK+bγ(IE )2m]
]
+
mbγ(IE)2
2aφK+bφγ(IE )2m
(
IE − I
)
+
bγ(IE)2ωβ
2aK+bγ(IE )2m
=
[
−bγ(IE )2m
2aK+bγ(IE )2m
]
pi∗ − β (y∗ − y)
[
bγ(IE )2m
a[2aK+bγ(IE )2m]
]
+
mbγ(IE)2
2aφK+bφγ(IE )2m
(
IE − I
)
+
bγ(IE)2ωβ
2aK+bγ(IE )2m
=
[
−bγ(IE )2m
2aK+bγ(IE )2m
]
pi∗ −
[
bβγ(IE )2m
a[2aK+bγ(IE )2m]
]
(y∗ − y)
+
mbγ(IE)2
2aφK+bφγ(IE )2m
(
IE − I
)
+
bγ(IE)2ωβ
2aK+bγ(IE )2m ,
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Table 2: Description of variables in investment and monetary policy
Parameter Interpretation
1. a Cost to central bank of missing inflation or interest target
2. b Cost to central bank of missing investment target
3. β Phillips curve-based cost to central bank of missing interest target
4. pi∗ Target interest rate
5. IE − I Gap between optimal and the investment level under natural rate of output
6. I Investment level under natural output
7. φ Inverse of the rate of risk aversion
8. K Total equity in banking system
9. γ Multiplier for systemic costs relative to I, which measures fire-sale costs
10. m Fraction of short-term debt in banking system, which measures system illiquidity
11. εy Output shock
piE − pi0 =
[
bγ(IE)2
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
] [
m
(
β
a
(y∗ − y) + 1
φ
(
IE − I
)
− pi∗
)
+ ωβ
]
. (31)
The central bank can use the same rate to control both inflation and targeting only if the
expression in (31) is identically zero, i.e., at least one of the terms on the RHS is zero. Let
us examine the first term. This term is non-zero because the central bank cares about fragility
(b > 0), fire sales occur (γ > 0), investment is positive (IE > 0), and there is always some short
term debt in the economy (m > 0). Therefore it suffices to examine only the second term. This
second term is zero if the target inflation rate is a specific linear function the investment gap:
pi∗ = βa (y
∗ − y) + 1
φ
(
IE − I
)
+
ωβ
m as was to be shown. 
D. Calibrations for optimal investment, short-rates, and threshold discount rate
We calibrate the key variables from Section 4, in order to illustrate them graphically.
Calibration of investment and short-rates
In this part we calibrate variables from Section 4.2 and 4.3. Aggregate investment is rep-
resented in equations (13}) and (14), while short rates under fragility and traditional central
banking are in equations (16) and (15). The main parameters are described below.
We approach determination of the parameter values through a combination of natural con-
straints, theoretical considerations, and banking practice. Notice that:
• Typical inflation targeting central banks put much higher weight on inflation loss than
output loss, i.e., a >> 1;
• The ratio IEk reflects the bank’s leverage ratio. The typical leverage in the banking industry
is about 12.5, rarely below 5; therefore, I
E
K = 5 (the lowest banking leverage) may be a
good guess;
• The value γΣiIi is the fire sale loss of one unit liquidated asset, therefore γIE < 1 — even
in the worse case when all the bank assets are liquidated, the banks can still recover some
value (1 − γIE per unit);
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• The reliance on short-term debt varies quite a lot across banks, and depends mainly on how
much investment banking business one bank gets involved. However, post-crisis banks
tend to focus more on the mainstream banking, and m is mostly between 20% and 40% in
Europe and US.
Calibrating the threshold discount rate
We now calibrate the threshold discount rate d for the infinitely repeated game from Section
4.4. The discount rate is given by expression (22), reproduced here:
d ≥ L˜
p
C(pi
p, Ip) − LpC(pip, Ip)
L˜pC(pi
p, Ip) − LEC(piE , IE)
≡ d.
The expressions for L˜pC , L
p
C and L
E
C depend on similar parameters to those for the optimal
inflation rates. In particular, equation (22) gives the central bank’s loss function as
LC(pic, pˆi, Ii) =
[
(y − y∗) + β
(
pic − pˆi + εy
)]2
+a (pic − pi∗)2+bγIi
mIirˆrc + (1 − m) Ii (r1 + δ) − ω
[
y + β
(
pic − pˆi + εy
)]
Ii
K
,
where pic ∈ {piE , pip} and Ii ∈ {IE , Ip}.
Preliminary results for computing threshold
Before we compute the threshold d¯, recall that piE and pip are calculated from equation (19)
in the text, as
piE =
2aK
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
pi∗ +
2βK
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
(y∗ − y) +
mbγ
(
IE
)2
2aφK + bφγ(IE)2m
(
IE − I
)
+
bγ
(
IE
)2
ωβ
2aK + bγ(IE)2m
− β
2
a + β2
εy
and
piP =
2aK
2aK + bγ(IP)2m
pi∗ +
2βK
2aK + bγ(IP)2m
(y∗ − y) +
mbγ
(
IP
)2
2aφK + bφγ(IP)2m
(
IP − I
)
+
bγ
(
IP
)2
ωβ
2aK + bγ(IP)2m
− β
2
a + β2
εy.
Further, IE and Ip satisfy the following conditions from equations (20) and (21) in the text:
ωIE K − r1K − Kδ + Kmδ − γIEr1 − γIEδ + γIEmδ + γ(IE)2ω = 0,
and
2ωIpK − r1K − Kδ + Kmδ − 2γIpr1 − 2γIpδ + 2γIpmδ − 3γ(Ip)2ω = 0,
respectively.
Computing the threshold d¯
30
Now we can compute the three different elements of the threshold discount rate in (22) –
namely LpC , L
E
C , and L˜
p
C . The first two are straightforward since they involve the bank and central
bank both playing cooperate or deviate:
LpC(pi
p, pˆi, Ip) =
[
(y − y∗) + β
(
piP − pˆi + εy
)]2
+ a
(
piP − pi∗
)2
+bγIP
mIPrˆrP + (1 − m) IP (r1 + δ) − ω
[
y + β
(
piP − pˆi + εy
)]
IP
K
; (32)
and
LEC(pi
E , pˆi, IE) =
[
(y − y∗) + β
(
piE − pˆi + εy
)]2
+ a
(
piE − pi∗
)2
+bγIE
mIE rˆrE + (1 − m) IE (r1 + δ) − ω
[
y + β
(
piE − pˆi + εy
)]
IE
K
. (33)
The third payoff, L˜pC , is different because it reflects the central bank’s payoff (by choosing
pi = pip) if the bank deviates (I = IE) for one period:
L˜pC(pi
p, pˆi, IE) =
[
(y − y∗) + β
(
piP − pˆi + εy
)]2
+ a
(
piP − pi∗
)2
+bγIE
mIE rˆrP + (1 − m) IE (r1 + δ) − ω
[
y + β
(
piP − pˆi + εy
)]
IE
K
. (34)
Thus the threshold discount factor d¯ in (22) can be computed from equations (32) to (34),
and the short rate and investment expressions from Section 2.1.
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